Axiomatic foundation for Lindahl pricing in the NIMBY context by Laurent-Lucchetti, Jérémy & Leroux, Justin
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Axiomatic foundation for Lindahl pricing
in the NIMBY context
Je´re´my Laurent-Lucchetti and Justin Leroux
HEC Montre´al
April 2009
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/14930/
MPRA Paper No. 14930, posted 1. May 2009 05:15 UTC
Axiomatic foundation for Lindahl pricing in the
NIMBY context∗
Jérémy Laurent-Lucchetti† and Justin Leroux‡§
April 25, 2009
∗We wish to thank Stefan Ambec, Olivier Bochet, Vincent Boucher, Bettina Klaus, Sidartha
Gordon, Dipjyoti Majumdar, Hervé Moulin, Yves Sprumont, Nicolas Sahuguet, Bernard Sinclair-
Desgagné and William Thomson, as well as participants of the Montréal Natural Ressources and
Environmental Economics Workshop and FQRSC for ﬁnancial support.
†HEC Montréal, Institut d'Économie Appliquée.
‡HEC Montréal, Institut d'Économie Appliquée and CIRPÉE.
§Corresponding author: justin.leroux@hec.ca. 3000, chemin de la Côte-Sainte-Catherine, Mon-
tréal (Québec), Canada H3T 2A7. Telephone number: 514 340-6864, Fax number: 514 340-6469.
1
Abstract: The siting of public facilities, such as prisons, airports or
incinerators for hazardous waste typically faces social rejection by local
populations (the "NIMBY" syndrome, for Not In My BackYard). These
public goods exhibit a private bad aspect which creates an asymmetry:
all involved communities beneﬁt from their existence, but only one (the
host community) bears the local negative externality. We view the sit-
ing problem as a cost sharing issue and provide an axiomatic foundation
for Lindahl pricing in this context. The set of axioms we introduce are
speciﬁcally designed to overcome the asymmetry of the problem.
Keywords: Public goods; Externalities; NIMBY; Location; Cost sharing.
JEL Classiﬁcation Numbers: D61, D62, H41, Q53, Q58, R52, R53.
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1 Introduction
The siting of public facilities, such as prisons, airports or nuclear waste disposals
typically faces social rejection by local populations. These goods are socially necessary
but come with local externalities (noise, pollution, noxious odors...) or bear a negative
connotation. Diﬀerent factors can be the cause of such rejection: the loss in the
economic value of property, the perceived loss in quality of life or the fear of health
eﬀects. In economic terms, these public goods have a private bad aspect to them
which creates a siting problem: all communities beneﬁt from the public good, but only
onethe hostbears the local nuisance. This asymmetry typically leads to costly
procedures or ineﬃcient siting1. Worse, for some diﬃcult cases no host has yet been
selected (e.g. a nuclear waste disposal in the United States, see the Environmental
Protection Agency, 2002). Such cases can even result in a stalemate.
The literature coins this public rejection phenomenon the NIMBY syndrome,
for Not In My BackYard. In practice, conventional approaches to the siting of a
"local bad" are currently characterized by a decide-announce-defend structure (see
the Environmental Protection Agency, 2002, and Marchetti, 2005, for comprehensive
reviews). First, (secret) investigations are carried out by the governing institution to
evaluate the technical suitability of a location. Then, the prospective host community
is confronted with the siting proposal and promises of compensation. In fact, without
compensation it seems diﬃcult for the host to accept a noxious facility.
In practice, a diﬃculty one faces when implementing such a project is that the
planner typically has access to much less information than the involved parties, which
causes a revelation problem. The mechanism design literature tackles the problem by
designing procedures procedure which are decision-eﬃcient : the chosen host should
be the one which incurs the lowest hosting cost (consisting of the cost of construction
and a disutility component) among all communities2.
1See Minehart and Neeman (2002) or Marchetti (2005).
2See Kunreuther and Kleindorfer (1986), Sullivan (1992), O'Sullivan (1993), Minehart and Nee-
3
However, another aspect of the siting problem relates to the sharing of the cost
borne by the host community so as to guarantee the stability of the agreement.
Taking into account such redistribution issues helps ease the siting process itself and
reinforces the stability of the agreement. And if not carefully considered, the structure
of the compensation itself could result in the rejection of the project, as pointed out in
Easterling (1992) and Frey et al. (1996). Furthermore, reviewing four cases of waste
disposal facilities in the Canadian context, Khun and Ballard (1998) conclude that
inequity perception and political dimensions (beyond the economic implications) were
the main causes of the NIMBY eﬀect. Similarly, Pol et al. (2006), adopting a social-
psychological approach, review previous literature and point out that "the outcomes
and lines of argument [reviewed] present the NIMBY issue in terms of distributive
justice, inequity perception and risk attribution."
The traditional approach in the economic literature focuses on the strategic prop-
erties of the procedures without treating explicitly the redistribution issue. By con-
trast, in a companion paper (Laurent-Lucchetti and Leroux, 2009) we design a simple
mechanism to select an eﬃcient site which preserves incentives and allows the imple-
mentation of any reasonable redistribution scheme. Knowing that such a mechanism
exists begs careful examination of the siting problem from a redistributive viewpoint.
Therefore, we shall ignore here any issue of strategic revelation and assume that
cost and beneﬁts parameters are known. Through the use of axioms speciﬁc to the
NIMBY context, we characterize a cost sharing method which shares the hosting cost
so as to ease the redistributive issues tied to the siting problem. It turns out that the
set of properties we deﬁne precisely characterize Lindahl pricing, which coincides in
this context with proportional sharing of costs with respect to beneﬁts. Traditionally,
numerous issues of public ﬁnancing are settled using Lindahl prices. However, despite
its well-known appealing properties in the standard case of public good provision, the
relevance of Lindahl pricing in the speciﬁc context at hand (combination of a public
man (2002) and Perez-Castrillo and Wettstein.
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good and a private bad) had not yet been ascertained as it was not a priori obvious
that sharing costs solely according to beneﬁts could be desirable.
The relevant characteristics we consider to model the problem consist of two com-
ponents: the beneﬁt a community obtains from the existence of the public good (bi
for community i) and the hosting cost of each community, ci, interpreted as the con-
struction cost plus a disutility if it is selected to host of the facility. Up to now, studies
on the siting issue have focused on the cost parameter to dictate the redistribution.
We believe that adding a beneﬁt component enhances the model in at least two ways.
First, it determines explicitly whether the public good should be constructed or not
(if the sum of the beneﬁts exceeds the total cost). Second, and most importantly,
it justiﬁes a bound on the cost share each community will be asked to pay. Thus,
ignoring the beneﬁt component would amount to ignoring the voluntary participation
of each community, which could be very problematic for the stability of any solution.
In fact, beneﬁts are traditionally central to the allocation of costs in public good
contexts.
We focus on the notion of responsibility to deﬁne axioms of interest: communities
should pay solely for aspects for which they are responsible and be compensated for
aspects for which they are not. We introduce two natural properties designed to level
the playing ﬁeld between the participants. Indeed, because all communities share the
same responsibilities towards the public good ex ante (before the host is selected)
the host should not bear any more responsibility ex post (after it is selected). In
this regard, the ﬁrst property we deﬁne mitigates the fact that eﬃciency requires the
host to be initially treated asymmetrically due to the fact that its hosting cost alone
determines the total cost. We propose to adapt a standard solidarity requirement
of the classical cost-sharing literature: cost monotonicity requires that if the total
cost were to increase, no one should pay less than before. Transposed unaltered to
the NIMBY context, cost monotonicity would imply that if the host's cost were to
increases, no community should have to pay a lower cost share. In order to recover
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symmetry, we extend this responsibility to all communities and require that cost
monotonicity apply to all (potential) hosting costs. We call this property extended cost
monotonicity : if the hosting cost of any community were to increase no community
should pay less than before. In addition, as argued in Laurent-Lucchetti and Leroux
(2009), extended cost monotonicity also has an appealing strategic implication as it
guarantees that the proposed mechanism is immune to coalitional deviations.
The second property we ask of a sharing rule is related to our interpretation
of the characteristics of a community as the aggregation of its inhabitants'. Thus,
the beneﬁt-cost proﬁle is subject to change as a result of population movements.
In practice, population movements are often observed after the announcement of a
host and may thus be endogenous (a point raised by Sullivan (1990) and Baumol
and Oates (1998)). Some agents (living in a non-host community) with very low
disutility for the proximity of the facility may move near the facility because of lower
housing prices or because of other advantages brought by the compensation scheme
(e.g. improved public infrastructures), while agents with high disutility may choose
to move out of the host community. This, in turn, may aﬀect the communities'
characteristics and their resulting cost share. To ensure ex post equity we address
this issue explicitly and deﬁne the following property: if population movements occur
between a subset of communities, they should collectively pay the same cost share
as a result and communities outside of this subset should be unaﬀected. In other
words, communities are held responsible for their own characteristics but not for the
distribution of the cost-beneﬁt proﬁle. We call this property Migration Independence.
In addition to these properties, which are speciﬁc to the siting issue, we also re-
quire eﬃciency and voluntary participation. We show that Lindahl pricing, which
coincides in this context with proportional sharing with respect to beneﬁts, is the
unique eﬃcient method which meets Extended Cost Monotonicity, Migration Inde-
pendence and Voluntary Participation.
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2 Related Literature
The ﬁnancing of public goods in the NIMBY context has been widely studied in
economics by considering the siting of a private bad. Typically, each community is
identiﬁed by a hosting cost (ci), then an auction-like procedure elicits a site (the
community with the lowest hosting cost, for eﬃciency) and a compensation scheme
is constructed to ensure incentive compatibility.
The ﬁrst paper to study the problem of siting waste treatment facilities in this
way is Kunreuther and Kleindorfer (1986). They propose a sealed-bid auction pro-
cedure to create an incentive for each community to truthfully reveal their costs
(disutility plus technical cost of hosting the facility): each community pays its own
bid. O'Sullivan (1993), Minehart and Neeman (2002), Perez-Castrillo and Wettstein
(2002) also propose auction mechanisms in the same vein, aiming for eﬃciency and
truthful revelation. The traditional trade-oﬀ between eﬃciency, incentive compati-
bility and budget balance is central in these papers and they tackle the siting issue
exclusively from a strategic viewpoint. However, they are silent with regards to re-
distribution.
By contrast, in a companion paper (Laurent-Lucchetti and Leroux, 2009) we de-
sign a simple mechanism to choose an eﬃcient site which allows the implementation
of any reasonable redistribution scheme. The unique subgame-perfect Nash equilib-
rium of our mechanism coincides with truthtelling, is eﬃcient, budget-balanced and
is immune to coalitional deviations. Thus, it selects an eﬃcient host and shares the
cost in a predetermined way so as to achieve virtually any normative goal (such as
the solution we propose here).
Taking a normative approach, Marchetti and Serra (2004) consider the siting
problem as a cooperative game. They study the standard solutions of cooperative
game theory (the Shapley value, the nucleolus and the core) with an asymmetric value
function: the value of the cooperation changes when the host changes. They design an
experiment and test which solution is the most appealing to participants. However,
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our modeling is quite distinct from theirs, as we wish to explicitly disentangle the
public good aspect (the beneﬁt component) and the private bad aspect (the hosting
cost) of the siting problem.
Sakaï (2006) axiomatizes the properties of the proportional procedure used by
Minehart and Neeman (2002). However, the model he uses is diﬀerent from ours: he
considers a waste disposal facility where the beneﬁts that each community obtains
from the facility are equal to the amount of waste generated by this community.
By contrast, we consider a broader set-up where the beneﬁts that each community
obtains from the public good could be independent of the "intensity" of consumption
of the good; for instance, a community could obtain a high beneﬁt from the existence
of a prison without sending any of its inhabitants in it.
3 The model and axioms
Let N = {1, ..., n} be the set of communities. Each community i = 1, ....n obtains a
beneﬁt, bi ≥ 0, from the consumption of the public good and incurs a cost, ci ≥ 0, if
it is the host of the public good. We view the characteristics of a community as the
sum of those of its inhabitants. Let (b, c) = (bi, ci)i²N be the beneﬁt-cost proﬁle. For
any agent i ∈ N , (b′i, b−i) refers to the vector b where bi has been replaced by b′i,a nd
for any subset S ⊆ N , bS denotes the projection of b onto RS+. We consider the cost
parameter to be a combination of the physical construction cost and the disutility
each community endures if it is the host of the public good.
Without loss of generality we rank communities from lowest to highest cost: c1 ≤
c2 ≤ .... ≤ cn. Eﬃcient siting requires that the host be a lowest cost community:
thus, we consider community 1 to be the host. Moreover, we assume
∑
N bi ≥ c1 so
that it is always eﬃcient to build the facility. Hence, an eﬃcient cost-sharing method
assigns a vector of nonnegative cost-shares x(b, c) ∈ RN+ such that
∑
N xi(b, c) = c1.
To overcome the natural asymmetry of the problem (one community bearing the
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cost for the beneﬁts of all) we deﬁne a number of properties for the cost-sharing
method which aim at leveling responsibilities among communities. The ﬁrst proper-
ties are standard fare in the distributive justice literature. We then introduce two
additional properties speciﬁc to the siting problem.
A basic incentives property is that of voluntary participation: communities should
not pay more than the beneﬁts they obtain from the existence of the public good:
Voluntary Participation (VP): For all b, c ∈ RN+ and all i ∈ N , xi(b, c) ≤ bi.
The second property reﬂects our view that communities are responsible for their
own characteristics. It states that if a community is in a proﬁle in which it obtains
higher beneﬁts from the existence of the public good, all else equal, then it should
not have to pay a lower cost share:
Monotonicity in beneﬁts (b-MON): For all b, b′, c ∈ RN+ and all i ∈ N,
bi ≤ b′i ⇒ xi((b′i, b−i), c) ≥ xi(b, c).
The same argument holds for the hosting cost: a standard requirement, called cost
monotonicity, states that no community should pay less if the total cost (the cost to
the host in our framework) were to increase. Because we wish the solution to not
treat the host asymmetrically, Extended Cost Monotonicity extends the responsibility
of the host community to the collective: it holds each community equally responsible
for the total cost and subjects all communities to cost monotonicity:
Extended Cost Monotonicity (ECM): For all i,j ∈ N ,
ci ≥ c′i ⇒ xj(b, (c′i, c−i)) ≥ xj(b, c)
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A possible justiﬁcation of ECM is the following: because ex ante when the
identity of the host is still unknownthe decision to build a facility is a collective
one, and because the cost parameter alone determines the identity of the host, the
sharing rule should treat the cost parameter of all communities somewhat symmetri-
cally (including that of non-host communities). In other words, the host is not any
more responsible for the total cost just because its own cost happens to be the lowest
in the distribution. The sharing rule should reﬂect this fact. In addition, as argued
in Laurent-Lucchetti and Leroux (2009), ECM also has an appealing strategic impli-
cation as it guarantees that the equilibrium of the proposed mechanism is immune to
coalitional deviations.
Finally, our last property reinforces our argument according to which no commu-
nity is responsible for the distribution of characteristics: if population movements
occur between a subset of communities, they should collectively pay the same joint
cost share and communities outside of this subset should be unaﬀected:
Migration Independence (MI): For all b,b′, c, c′ ∈ RN+ and any S ⊆ N :
∑
j²S c
′
j =
∑
j²S cj
and
∑
j²S b
′
j =
∑
j²S bj
and mini∈S(ci) = mini∈S(c′i)
 =⇒
 xi((b′S, b−S), (c′S, c−S)) = xi(b, c),∀i²N\Sand ∑j²S xj((b′S, b−S), (c′S, c−S)) =∑j²S xj(b, c) .
This property directly addresses the concern of endogenous migration linked to
the NIMBY problem raised by the applied literature (see Sullivan (1990) and Baumol
and Oates (1998)): some agents may move near the facility or away from it after the
announcement of the project. Migration Independence insures that the cost shares of
communities are unaﬀected as much as possible after those migrations. This property
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is related to the well-known axiom of No Advantageous Reallocation (NAR) in claims
problems, like the rationing and surplus sharing contexts. NAR is used in particular
to characterize the egalitarian rule, the proportional rule, as well as many other
surplus-sharing methods (see Moulin, 2002). NAR addresses the problem of strategic
manipulation of claims and asks that no agents gain by reallocating their claims
among themselves. However, the normative content conveyed by our formulation is
far from strategic, as we consider migration decisions to be out of the communities'
control.
4 Lindahl Pricing
In our context, Lindahl prices can be deﬁned as follows for any i:
xi(b, c) =
bi∑
N bj
c1 (1)
This method simply shares the cost proportionally to the beneﬁts each community
obtains from the public good. In other words, it shares the hosting cost by applying a
"ﬂat rate", c1P
N bj
, to each unit of beneﬁt that a community obtains from the existence
of the public facility. Given that the provision of the public good is binary, pricing
according to marginal beneﬁts is tantamount to charging according to beneﬁts.
Theorem: Given n ≥ 3, Lindahl pricing is the unique eﬃcient cost-sharing
method meeting VP, ECM, and MI.
Proof : See Appendix.
The intuition for why this method meets MI is that if population movements
occur between a subset of communities their aggregate cost share remains constant
because the sum of beneﬁts remains. This method meets VP because the ratio c1P
N bj
is less than one by eﬃciency. Clearly, ECM is satisﬁed.
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Other intuitive ways of splitting the hosting cost exist. For instance, the con-
strained egalitarian method (where the total cost is equally split among communities,
up to the voluntary participation constraint) fails to satisﬁes MI. Indeed, when popu-
lation movement occurs, it is possible for certain communities to beneﬁt from a change
in the population distribution while other communities suﬀer: a movement from an
unconstrained community which "transfers" a higher beneﬁts to a constrained com-
munity, everything else equal, will lead to an increase in their aggregate cost share
and other communities will beneﬁt. Also, sharing the hosting cost in proportion to
each community hosting cost (the c′is) obviously fails ECM : a higher hosting cost
(for a community other than the host) means it will pay a higher cost share, thus
beneﬁtting all other communities.
5 Conclusion
We have characterized a simple solution to ﬁnance a public good in the NIMBY
context. Our aim was to capture the speciﬁcity of the problem (one community
bears the cost, beneﬁts accrue to all) and overcome it by an appropriate method
which focuses on redistributive properties: the host should no longer be perceived as
a "victim". Thus, we designed a set of axioms which level the playing ﬁeld among
communities by arguing that communities are responsible for their own characteristics
but not for the distribution of the beneﬁt-cost proﬁle. It turns out that this set of
axioms characterizes Lindahl prices, which coincide here with the proportional sharing
of cost with respect to beneﬁts.
In practice, the planner interested in implementing Lindahl prices must obtain
information on (b, c), the beneﬁt-cost proﬁle. In fact, in a companion paper (Laurent-
Lucchetti and Leroux, 2009), we propose a procedure which elicits the beneﬁt-cost
proﬁle and selects an eﬃcient host while implementing any redistribution scheme.
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A Proof of Theorem
Let x be an eﬃcient cost-sharing method which meets VP, ECM and MI.
Step 1: Consider a beneﬁt-cost proﬁle(b, c) ∈ R2N+ . Let c′ ∈ RN+ be such that
c′1 = c
′
2 = ... = c
′
n = c1. By ECM no agent should pay a higher cost share under
proﬁle (b, c′) than under proﬁle (b, c): xi(b, c) ≥ xi(b, c′) for all i ∈ N . By budget
balance the cost shares in proﬁles (b, c) and (b, c′) should coincide:
x(b, c) = x(b, c′). (2)
Hence, the cost shares of each agent are solely determined by the proﬁle b and the
lowest cost c1. From now on we will slightly abuse notation and write x(b, c1) instead
of x(b, c).
Step 2: We now show that, by MI, the cost share of an agent i is determined by
bi,
∑
j 6=i bj and c1.Let i ∈ N and let b, b′ ∈ RN+ be such that b′i = bi and
∑
N\i b
′
j =∑
N\i bj. By MI, agent i should obtain the same cost share under proﬁles (b, c) and
(b′, c): xi(b′, c1) = xi(b, c1). So, xi(b, c1) depends only upon bi,
∑
j 6=i bj and c1 for all
i ∈ N . It follows immediately that xi depends only upon bi,
∑
j∈N bj and c1 for all
i ∈ N . .
Step 3: Let c1 ∈ R+, i, j ∈ N and b, b′ ∈ RN+ be such that b′i = bi+ bj, b′j = 0 and
b′k = bk ∀ k 6= i, j. For notational convenience, we deﬁne B =
∑
j∈N bj =
∑
j∈N b
′
j By
MI, xi(b′i, B, c1)+xj(b′j, B, c1) = xi(bi, B, c1)+xj(bj, B, c1). By VP, xj(b′j, b′N , c1) = 0.
Thus,
xi(bi + bj, bN , c1) = xi(bi, bN , c1) + xj(bj, bN , c1). (3)
Given c1 and bN , the cost share of community i is only determined by bi. Again,
we slightly abuse notations and rewrite equation (3):
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xi(bi + bj) = xi(bi) + xj(bj). (4)
which holds for all bi, bj such that bi, bj ≥ 0 and bi + bj ≤ bN .
Similarly,
xj((bi + bj)) = xi(bi) + xj(bj). (5)
holds for all bi, bj such that bi, bj ≥ 0 and bi + bj ≤ bN .
Thus,
xj ≡ xi on (0, bN) ∀ i, j. (6)
By combining equations (3), (4), (5) and (6) we obtain:
xi((bi + bj)) = xi(bi) + xi(bj). (7)
for all bi, bj such that bi, bj ≥ 0 and bi+bj ≤ bN , which is a Cauchy functional equation.
Step 5: Following a well-known result of functional equations theory (see Aczèl,
1966), the general solution of such a functional equation is a linear function. Thus,
x(bi) = λbi (8)
for all bi in our domain.
Step 6: To conclude the proof we show that λ = c1
bN
, a result which follows imme-
diately from combining expression (8) with the budget-balance condition. Therefore,
xi(b, c) = bi
c1
bN
(9)
which is precisely Lindahl pricing.
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